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We present a scheme for three-party simultaneous quantum secure direct communication by using
EPR pairs. In the scheme, three legitimate parties can simultaneously exchange their secret mes-
sages. It is also proved to be secure against the intercept-and-resend attack, the disturbance attack
and the entangled-and-measure attack.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been one of
the most promising applications of quantum mechanics,
which provides unconditionally secure key exchange. The
basic principle is that two remote legitimate users (Al-
ice and Bob) establish a shared secret key through the
transmission of quantum signals and use this key to en-
crypt or decrypt the secret messages. Since Bennett and
Brassard [1] proposed the standard QKD protocol in 1984
(BB84), a good many QKD protocols have been advanced
[2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
In recent years, a new concept, quantum secure di-
rect communication (QSDC) has been proposed [7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13]. Different from quantum key distribution
whose object is to establish a common random key be-
tween two parties, quantum secure direct communication
is to transmit the secret messages directly without first
establishing a random key to encrypt them. Bostro¨m
and Felbinger’s protocol [8], which was called the ping-
pong protocol, allows decoding the encoded bits instanta-
neously and directly in each respective transmission run.
However, it was proved to be insecure against the dis-
turbance attack [14]. Deng et al [9] have proposed a
two-step quantum direct communication protocol by us-
ing EPR pairs. In this two-step scheme, the EPR pairs
are divided into two sequences, which are sent by two
steps, and the receiver needs to check the security of
the channel twice (one for checking sequence and another
for message sequence). In these schemes, QSDC is only
one way communication. Based on the idea of ping-pong
QSDC scheme, Nguyen [15] proposed a quantum dialogue
scheme by using EPR pairs that enables both legitimate
parties to exchange their secret messages in a direct way.
However, it is not secure against the intercept-and-resend
attack. An eavesdropper who adopts this attack strat-
egy can steal the secret messages without being detected.
More recently, Jin et al [16] proposed a three-party simul-
taneous QSDC scheme by using the GHZ states.
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In this paper, we will introduce a three-party (Alice,
Bob and Charlie) simultaneous QSDC scheme by using
EPR pairs. In our scheme, each can obtain two other’s
messages simultaneously. Moreover, it will be shown that
this protocol is provably secure.
II. THE THREE-PARTY SIMULTANEOUS
QSDC SCHEME WITH EPR PAIRS
Suppose that Alice, Bob and Charlie have a secret mes-
sage respectively, without loss of generality we assume
that the message length of three parties is the same.
Alice′s message = {i1, i2, i3, · · · , iN}, (1)
Bob′s message = {j1, j2, j3, · · · , jN}, (2)
Charlie′s message = {k1, k2, k3, · · · , kN}, (3)
with in, jn, kn ∈ {0, 1}.
Alice, Bob and Charlie agree on that Bob performs the
two unitary operations
Cjn = { I, if jn = 0,σx, if jn = 1, (4)
Charlie operates the two unitary operations
C′kn = {
I, if kn = 0,
σz , if kn = 1,
(5)
where
I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|, σx = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|, σz = |0〉〈0|−|1〉〈1|.
(6)
To secretly exchange their messages, Alice first pro-
duces a large enough number of entangled pairs all in
the state
|Ψ00〉ht = 1√
2
(|0〉|1〉+ |1〉|0〉)ht. (7)
Here h and t denote home particle remaining in the place
of Alice, and transmitting particle being transmitted in
the communication, respectively. Then Alice, Bob and
Charlie proceed as follows:
2(S0) Protocol is initialized n = 0.
(S1) Set n = n+ 1. Alice keeps qubit hn with her and
sends qubit tn to Bob through the quantum channel.
(S2) When Bob received a qubit, he has two choices:
one is to measure it, the other is to encode it.
2.1 If Bob decides to measure the qubit, that means
to check the eavesdropping, he can complete it by the
following procedure:
(a) Bob chooses randomly one of the two sets of mea-
suring basis (MB), say {|0〉, |1〉} and {|+〉, |−〉}, to mea-
sure the qubit tn.
(b) Bob tells Alice the MB chosen by him and the
outcome of his measurement.
(c) Alice chooses the same MB to measure the qubit
hn and checks with the result of Bob. If no eavesdropper
exists their results should be correlated, i.e., if Alice gets
|0〉 (|1〉), Bob will get |1〉 (|0〉), when they choose their
measurements along the Z-direction; or if Alice gets |+〉,
(|−〉), Bob will obtain |+〉 (|−〉) when they choose the MB
{|+〉, |−〉}. If their results are correlated, set n = n − 1,
go to step 1 and continue communication. Otherwise,
they abort communication.
2.2 If Bob wants to encode his messages, he selects
a running mode from message mode (MM)and control
mode (CM).
1) If he selects MM, he encodes jn by performing the
transformation Cjn on the qubit tn.
2) If he selects CM, he does nothing.
Then Bob sends the qubit tn to Charlie.
(S3) Charlie confirms Bob that he received a qubit.
Then Bob announces the running mode.
3.1 If it was run in CM, obviously the qubits tn and hn
are in the state |Ψ00〉ht, Charlie and Alice check eaves-
dropper as procedure 2.1.
3.2 If it was run in MM, Charlie selects a running mode
from his two modes: MM and CM.
1) If he selects MM, Charlie encodes kn by perform-
ing the transformation C′kn on the qubit tn, and then he
sends it to Alice.
2) If he selects CM, Charlie randomly prepares a decoy
qubit in one of states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} and sends it to
Alice.
(S4) Alice confirms Charlie that she received a qubit.
Then Charlie announces the running mode.
4.1) If the running mode was CM, Charlie publicly re-
veals the qubit state. Alice measures the decoy qubit
using the corresponding basis. If the result is in accor-
dance with Charlie’s result, set n = n− 1 and go to step
1, otherwise abort the communication.
4.2) If the running mode was MM, Alice measures
tn and hn in the Bell basis. Suppose the result is
|Ψrnsn〉hntn , Alice encodes her message into rn, sn by
rn ⊕ in = xn, sn ⊕ in = yn. (8)
Then Alice announces publicly the values of (xn, yn).
If n < N , go to step 1.
(S5) The three-party simultaneous QSDC has been
successfully completed.
Now, we explicitly analyze the protocol described
above. After Bob encodes his bit jn on the EPR-pair
state |Ψ00〉hntn , the pair state becomes
|Ψ00〉hntn → Cjn |Ψ00〉hntn = |Ψjn0〉hntn . (9)
Furthermore, after Charlie encodes his message, the state
is transformed as
|Ψjn0〉hntn → C′kn |Ψjn0〉hntn = |Ψjnkn〉hntn , (10)
where
|Ψ10〉hntn =
1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉)hntn , (11)
|Ψ01〉hntn =
1√
2
(|1〉|0〉 − |0〉|1〉)hntn , (12)
|Ψ11〉hntn =
1√
2
(|0〉|0〉 − |1〉|1〉)hntn . (13)
Therefore if no eavesdropper exists, Alice’s measurement
result will be
rn = jn, sn = kn. (14)
Clearly, if Alice publicly announces the values of rn, sn,
the messages of Bob and Charlie will be revealed. For
realizing the secure QSDC, Alice plays a trick: she en-
codes her message into rn and sn, which was described
in Eq. (8).
By Eqs.(8) and (14), we conclude easily that
jn ⊕ kn = xn ⊕ yn. (15)
Obviously, Alice, Bob and Charlie can obtain messages
of other parties by Eqs.(8), (14) and (15). Decoding rules
can be expressed as
Alice jn = xn ⊕ in, kn = yn ⊕ in, (16)
Bob in = xn ⊕ jn, kn = xn ⊕ yn ⊕ jn, (17)
Charlie in = yn ⊕ kn, jn = xn ⊕ yn ⊕ kn. (18)
From the above decoding rules we may find that the mes-
sages in, jn and kn play two-fold role in the QSDC: on the
one hand, they represent the messages of three parties;
on the other hand, they play a role of the keys of three
parties. However, it is worth pointing out that these keys
are different from a private key which is prior shared by
the parties of communication, but three parties encode
these keys to the EPR pairs, so these keys hide in the
entanglement.
III. SECURITY OF QSDC
In the following, we briefly discuss the security of the
scheme.
Firstly, we consider the intercept-and-resend attack
and disturbance attack. In both two attacks, Eve would
destroy the entanglement of particles hn and tn in A→ B
3line or B → C line. In C → A line, Eve’s attack will
cause disaccord between Charlie’s decoy qubit state and
Alice’s measurement outcome. Each of the above cases
will make Eve be detcted with a detection probability
of 1/2. Thus our scheme is secure against the intercept-
and-resend attack and disturbance attack.
Eve’s another attack is entangle-and-measure attack
[9]. It acts in the following way. Eve prepares an ancilla
in the initial state |χ〉e and waits in the route. When the
qubit tn passes by, Eve entangles his ancilla with it by
performing a unitary operation Eˆ defined as
Eˆ|0〉t|χ〉e = α|0〉t|χ0〉e + β|1〉t|χ1〉e, (19)
Eˆ|1〉t|χ〉e = α|1〉t|χ0〉e + β|0〉t|χ1〉e, (20)
with α, β satisfying the normalization condition |α|2 +
|β|2 = 1 and {|χ0〉e, |χ1〉e} being the pure orthonormal-
ized ancilla’s states uniquely determined by the unitary
operation Eˆ. Obviously, Eve’s attack in A → B or
B → C destroys the correlation of EPR pairs. The state
of EPR pair and the ancilla becomes
Eˆ|Ψ00〉ht|χ〉e = α|Ψ00〉ht|χ0〉e + β|Ψ10〉ht|χ1〉e, (21)
Eve conceals himself if his measurement ends up with
|χ0〉e. However if the measurement outcome is |χ1〉e, he
will be detected. If Eve’s attack is in the C → A line,
besides the above Eqs. (19) and (20), the attack on the
decoy qubit in |+〉 (|−〉) is expressed as
Eˆ|+〉t|χ〉e = |+〉t(α|χ0〉e + β|χ1〉e), (22)
Eˆ|−〉t|χ〉e = |−〉t(α|χ0〉e − β|χ1〉e), (23)
In this case, the eavesdropper can not be detected. How-
ever the eavesdropper can be found by Charlie and Alice
when the decoy qubit is in the state |0〉 or |1〉. So our
scheme is also secure against this attack.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have proposed a protocol for three-
party quantum secure direct communication by using
EPR states. Our scheme has its own advantages com-
pared with the schemes proposed previously. Firstly,
three legitimate parties can simultaneously exchange
their secret messages. Secondly, compared with the
preparation of GHZ states, obviously the EPR state will
be more easily prepared in the experiment.
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